CHURCHILL, S. D. (2000)

PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY

and

CHURCHILL, S. D.
and
RICHER, P. (2000)

PHENOMENOLOGY

In

A. E. KAZDIN (ED.)

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY

VOL. 6

PP. 162-168

PP. 168-173

Oxford: Oxford University Press

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY

Alan E. Kazdin
Editor in Chief

VOLUME 6


AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

2000

presente y futuro [Psychology in Latin America: Past, present, and future]. Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores.

Rubén Ardila

PESSIMISM. *See* Optimism and Pessimism.

PESTALOZZI, JOHANN HEINRICH (1746–1827), Swiss educator. Pestalozzi wrote extensively on educational and social reform and put his educational ideas into practice in several experimental schools. His first school, for poor children, was founded in 1775 at Neuhof; it closed in 1780, in large part because of Pestalozzi's financial ineptitude. He did not run a school or teach again until 1799. In the interim, he wrote on a wide variety of social and educational issues. His only popular success was the romantic novel *Leonard and Gertrude*, published in 1781, which was intended as an exposition of his educational ideas. In 1798 Pestalozzi set up another school for poor children, which closed after only a few months. Almost immediately Pestalozzi began a series of teaching posts in Burgdorf. Positive evaluations of his efforts by the town school commission led, in 1800, to the use of the castle at Burgdorf for his own school. In 1804 this school was also forced to close for political and financial reasons. In 1801, Pestalozzi had published *How Gertrude Teaches her Children*, a more systematic presentation of his educational ideas than *Leonard and Gertrude*. It was this book that established Pestalozzi's reputation throughout Europe. Pestalozzi went to Yverdon in 1804 and started yet another school, which lasted until 1825, when financial problems, as well as disagreements among the staff, led to its closure. Pestalozzi died 2 years later.

Pestalozzi's ideas were immensely popular in Europe and were spread not only in his writings, including teaching manuals for particular content areas, but also through the schools themselves. Prominent and influential visitors included Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Johann Friedrich Herbart, and Friedrich Froebl, the founder of the kindergarten movement, who spent more than a year at Yverdon. After Pestalozzi's death, Horace Mann visited German and Swiss schools and worked to incorporate Pestalozzi's ideas into the school system of Massachusetts.

Pestalozzi's ideas about the education of young children were in marked contrast to the educational practice of the time. Almost anyone could open a school, regardless of educational or psychological qualifications. Rote memorizing of the catechism was a major goal of early education; severe physical punishment was common. Pestalozzi proposed a number of changes. First, he emphasized direct observation of the physical world: he rejected the heavy use of books as the sole source of knowledge, at least during the early years, and rote memorization at any age. Children were to learn through their own senses, often outside the classroom; only then were children to read about general and abstract ideas. Second, the first qualification of a teacher was affection for children; teachers needed to provide the love and security of a family. Pestalozzi disapproved of corporal punishment and rarely viewed it as necessary. Finally, Pestalozzi proposed that teachers themselves needed to be taught about the nature of children and the best methods for teaching them. His schools served not only as demonstrations of his ideas, but also as schools for teachers. Pestalozzi's ideas revolutionized and humanized the treatment of young children in schools; he also revolutionized, if not created, teaching as a professional discipline.

Bibliography

Downs, R. B. (1975). *Heinrich Pestalozzi*. Boston: Twayne.

Pestalozzi, J. H. (1977). *"How Gertrude teaches her children."* In D. A. Robinson (Ed.), *Significant contributions to the history of psychology, 1750–1920* (Series B, Vol. 2, pp. 17–391). Washington, DC: University Publications of America. (Original work published 1801)

Silber, K. (1976). *Pestalozzi: The man and his work* (4th ed., rev.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Emily S. Davidson

PET. *See* Brain Imaging Techniques.

PHALLIC STAGE. *See* Psychosexual Stages.

PHARMACOTHERAPY. *See* Psychopharmacology, *article on* Pharmacotherapy.

PH.D. *See* Doctoral Degree.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY. The term *phenomenological* is often used by psychologists to refer simply to the subjective point of view, as well as to the world as seen through the perspective of a particular person. The term has, however, a long history in the

field of psychiatry, beginning with Karl Jaspers and continuing with the work of Eugene Minkowski, Ludwig Binswanger, Viktor von Gebsattel, Medard Boss, Frederik Buytendijk, Jan van den Berg, Kurt Goldstein, Viktor Frankl, and others. In contemporary psychiatry, the term tends to be used superficially to refer to the symptomatology pertaining to various diagnostic entities. The aforementioned European psychiatrists, however, used this term in a much more systematic way to refer to the entire existential structure of a person's lived world. The roots of all the phenomenological psychopathogists can be traced to Edmund Husserl; many of them were influenced by Martin Heidegger as well.

The phenomenological movement in American psychology was bolstered in the late 1950s by the publication of Rollo May's landmark volume, *Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology* (1958), and by the establishment in 1959 of an innovative graduate program in psychology at Duquesne University. The intellectual roots of this program, as well as of May's volume, were European in origin, including philosophers, psychiatrists, and philosopher-psychiatrists whose texts, mostly untranslated, had begun to be communicated within both academic and clinical circles in Europe and America. Not only were there two distinct circles of existential psychologists already developing in America (grouped respectively around Rollo May and Viktor Frankl), but also a humanistic movement, all of which were to have their influence on the emerging field of phenomenological psychology. Throughout the 1960s and into the early 1970s, the term *existential psychology and psychiatry* was used much more frequently than in the last quarter of the twentieth century to refer to this movement (although at the time it was considered less a movement per se, and more an attitude). In fact, the term *existential psychology* originally embraced a more overarching vision, wherein phenomenology was understood as the first stage of development within a larger professional and academic discipline (see May, 1969).

As in the case with existentialism, existential psychology is not a true system, but rather a term used to refer to what appears in retrospect as a movement consisting of like-minded individuals who had familiarized themselves with the thought of such thinkers as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, Buber, Heidegger, and Sartre (as well as with the writings of literary artists like Kafka and Dostoevsky) and found in their writings a basis for understanding what was being discovered in personality research and confronted in consulting rooms. Psychologists like Rollo May, Gordon Allport, Carl Rogers, R. D. Laing, Viktor Frankl, Erich Fromm, and James Bugental were less concerned with methodological issues and more concerned with the themes that were the upshot of existential thinking. Freedom, alienation, the facticity of death, estrangement of self from other, the falling into "inauthenticity," the possibility of becoming an "authentic self," ontological guilt, and the experience of nothingness all served as a basis for understanding the plights of humanity in the twentieth century.

Existential psychology was, at the outset, associated more with an optimistic approach to psychotherapy than with formal research. Its representatives devoted themselves to healing the lost souls, the "hollow" men and women of our time, who have lost touch with themselves, their fellow humanity, and their sense of wonder in the face of the transcendent. Thus, Rollo May wrote *The Cry for Myth* (1990) and *Man's Search for Himself* (1953) based on his therapeutic contact with modern-day people whose central complaint can be described as a loss of meaning. Viktor Frankl's reflections as a survivor of Nazi death camps took this one step further in his similarly titled book (*Man's Search for Meaning*, 1963). Erich Fromm, on the other hand, wrote a commentary on modern humanity's refusal to take responsibility for itself in his books ironically titled *The Sane Society* (1955) and *Escape from Freedom* (1941). Thomas Szasz turned our attention to "the manufacture madness" and "the myth of mental illness," and R. D. Laing founded a residential clinic where he attempted to live with and understand people labeled as psychotic. His work with schizophrenics lent itself especially well to a dialogue with Sartre's thinking, particularly his writings on concrete relations with others and his existential psychoanalyses; the outcome was Laing's own classic texts *The Divided Self* (1965) *The Politics of Experience* (1967), and *Sanity, Madness, and the Family* (1964).

Eventually, Adrian Van Kaam (1966) would write a book that articulated not simply the foundations of existential psychology, but rather the existential foundations of all psychology, expressing the hope that by the next century existential psychology would not be necessary any more, because, hopefully, by then all psychology would be truly existential (in the sense of having escaped the pitfalls of positivism and embraced the holistic perspective of existential-phenomenology). By the end of the 1960s, Duquesne University's program was using the term *existential-phenomenological* to refer to its paradigm, with the intent of acknowledging its indebtedness both to existential thinking for providing a new philosophical anthropology, and to phenomenology for providing a new approach and methodology for research. From that time forward, it has been the rule rather than the exception to see the full term *existential-phenomenology* used in book titles and conference papers. The term *existential* seemed to carry more weight in the earlier days of the movement, perhaps because it triggered associations to both philosophical and literary writings on freedom, angst, authenticity, death, and so on. Eventually, through

conventional usage, it became understood that the shorter term, *phenomenological psychology*, implied existential influences, even if only tacitly.

Although there are many individuals and institutions throughout North America, Europe, and South Africa contributing to the development of this new paradigm, phenomenological psychology has been developed in a systematic way in America primarily at Duquesne University and at the many schools to which its graduates have migrated. From the early 1960s into the 1980s, the Duquesne school consisted of both a research paradigm for qualitative research that was phenomenologically based, and an application of existential-phenomenological principles to clinical assessment and psychotherapy. Inspired originally by the thought of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, psychologists at Duquesne developed an empirical-phenomenological procedure with the aim of using it to clarify the essence of various kinds of psychological phenomena through an investigation of specific experiences in which these phenomena are revealed.

The key to this method is not simply that its data consist of verbal testimonies of various types of experience; this alone merely qualifies it more generally as a type of qualitative research. The hallmark of the phenomenological method in psychology is its *thematization of how an individual co-constitutes the world of experience* that has been described in self-report data, therapy transcripts, or other forms of expression. Data analysis consists of the identification of constitutive "horizons" or "modes of presence" that make possible the experience of the situations described. There is a turning, then, from given facts (the data as presented) to intended meanings (the data as understood by the researcher)—from the simple *givenness* of the situation in the individual's experience to a reflective apprehension of that situation's meaning as having been co-constituted ("intended") by the individual's consciousness, or existential presence. This is by no means a return to introspectionism: As Sartre dramatically observed, if one could ever get "inside" a consciousness, one would be seized upon by a whirlwind and thrown back out into the world! Phenomenological psychology is, emphatically, the study of persons in situations.

The psychological work of empirical-phenomenological research consists of the researcher entering into dialogue with the data. The researcher's involvement in co-constituting the findings is often attacked as a form of subjectivism; however, from within the phenomenological understanding of the interpretive process, such an involvement of the knower with the known is inevitable. Indeed, it expresses the implication of the principle of intentionality for the research process itself. This does not mean, however, that the procedure involves some kind of introspection that is inaccessible to someone wishing to verify the reliability of the findings; nor does it imply some kind of relativism or privatism in the understanding of data. This is, first, because what is being known here is not some inner realm to which there exists only private access; rather, what is being known here is precisely the relationship of the individual to the world, and this relationship is not accessible by turning inward (wherever that might lead). Merleau-Ponty argued that whenever we do succeed in having something worthwhile to say about our own experience, it is because we are looking at it the way another person would, that is, from a third-person point of view. Furthermore, the researcher, upon entering into a dialogue with the data, is not attempting to look inside his or her own consciousness of the data, but is, rather, engaged in a narrative act of understanding a life situation. The interpretive process here is circumscribed, of course, by the researcher's perspective on the data. But this perspective is made explicit to anyone reading the analysis, in the form of a set of research questions and guiding principles. This leads not to *relativism*, but to a simple acknowledgment of the *relativity of understanding*.

Following Heidegger, existential-phenomenological psychologists acknowledge the impossibility of presuppositionless knowledge, and hence have accepted the notion that all description is already interpretation. This means that no claims of universality (as was the case in Husserl's "pure" phenomenology) are to be made in empirical-phenomenological research; rather, research results are presented as tentative statements opening upon a limitless field of possible interpretations. Although phenomenological psychologists follow hermeneutic principles first articulated by Dilthey, they stop short at the kind of relativism associated with emerging postmodernist traditions. Evidence for this is to be found in the insistence that research results be adequate to a body of facts or data (a modified version of the correspondence criterion for truth) rather than merely being required to "hang together" in a clear and cogent manner (a coherence criterion for truth favored by narrative psychologists). The emphasis of this research paradigm can be described as a fidelity toward the phenomenon. A psychological phenomenon is understood here not as an event "in itself," but rather as something that occurs "for someone." The situations in which I experience anger, jealousy, joy, futility, intimacy, courage, self-esteem, self-deception, clinical insight, being victimized, and so on, are not approached by the phenomenological psychologist as though there were some objective reference point from which to observe and describe the events taking place. Rather, there is an acknowledgment of an always already existing perspective through which the individual experiences his or her world, and, in turn, through which the researcher takes up the experience of the research participant.

The key principle for verifying the findings of this research is for the reader to look at the data from the perspective of the research questions posed to the data, and to assess if the findings presented ring true as possibilities of meaning. This is where the hermeneutic principle of *Wiederholung* ("repetition," better translated as "retrieval") enters into empirical-phenomenological research in psychology. One does not expect to be able to repeat someone else's analysis and get the same results; rather, one looks to see if one can retrieve similar meanings from the data, when looking through the filter of the research questions that were posed to the data by the researcher. Phenomenological psychologists do indeed filter their research data, not through formulas or statistics, but through frameworks of understanding and questions born from their own involvement with the data. Just as the dialectical relationship between person and world is accessible to critical reflection on the part of the researcher, so also is the dialectical relationship between researcher and research findings accessible to critical reflection on the part of other researchers. As colleagues and co-researchers, we coexist within a hermeneutic circle of interpretation and understanding.

Another hermeneutic principle at work in empirical-phenomenological research is the acknowledgment and utilization of a set of guiding principles derived from the investigations of philosophical phenomenologists. Among the foundational ideas that guide the reflective work of phenomenological psychologists are concepts such as intentionality, worldhood, embodiment, existence, freedom, and temporality. Such concepts serve as a medium, or lens, through which we understand the phenomenal world before us. This approach to the use of concepts in psychological research is consistent with the original Greek meaning of *eidos* (from which we derive the English word "idea"), which meant both something that is seen and something by means of which one sees. In this sense, fundamental concepts are ways of seeing that enable something to be seen.

Doing psychology phenomenologically is ultimately predicated upon a *sensitivity to meanings* that is the cumulative result of a disciplined apprenticeship in human science methodology. This approach draws heavily upon empathy as an investigatory posture. In empathy, I participate in the other's positioning himself or herself from a unique perspective within a situation. In reading self-report data empathically, attention is directed to the subtleties contained in language, through which worlds of experience are revealed (and also concealed). In particular, the phenomenological psychologist attends to ways in which an individual's participation in the co-creation of experience is revealed. The operative principle here is Husserl's notion of intentionality, a teleological construct that refers to our psychological involvement in the world of experience: a concept that replaces the natural scientific principle of causality as the defining principle of psychological inquiry.

Husserl originally outlined the possibility for phenomenological psychology as an eidetic discipline, that is, a strictly philosophical enterprise aimed at laying the foundations for an empirical psychology. In agreement with Dilthey, Husserl believed that description, rather than explanation, was to be the means for identifying the essential constituents of psychological phenomena. His unique, and problematic, idea was that an a priori, or propaedeutic, understanding of one's subject matter must be accomplished before engaging in empirical investigations. (This idea was subsequently rejected by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.) Husserl's original aim for his phenomenological psychology was an epistemological one: he wanted to establish a set of principles that would preclude the various species of "psychologism" (e.g., the reduction of an idea to the cognitive acts that produce it) prevalent in his day. It is also significant that for Husserl, the term *empirical psychology* meant, specifically, the scientific investigation of consciousness: the study of bodily events concomitant to specific conscious experiences belonged properly to the field of psychology. Thus, for Husserl, the term *physiological psychology* would be an oxymoron.

If the interest of Husserl's "pure" phenomenology was to articulate the intentionality of consciousness in such a way as to ground all assertions, philosophical or otherwise, in the relationship of consciousness to its objects (all consciousness is consciousness *of* something), Husserl's followers expanded and deepened this interest to embrace the full relationship between subject and world. By applying hyphens to Husserl's (1913/1982) expression, Heidegger (1927/1962) introduced "Being-in-the-world" as the indissoluble intentional unity that can be further articulated in terms of its existential characteristics. These *existentialia* are the ontological conditions of possibility for human existence: as such, they express the ways that we *have to be*, in whatever ways we may *happen to be*. Among the *existentialia* described by Heidegger are language, understanding, speech, moodedness, spatiality, temporality, care, and Being-toward-death: all equiprimordial in their constitutive function with respect to human existence. This means that no one existential characteristic has priority over the others, but rather each is mutually implicated by the other. Thus, one cannot talk about the spatiality of a particular person's world without invoking the ways in which this person understands the world, which in turn will be based upon the ways in which this person anticipates death, how this then finds expression in the person's attunement to others, and is at the same time a function of the disclosive power of language and expression.

Influenced by Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger, Sartre

wrote extensively about consciousness, concrete relations with others, freedom, and responsibility. He viewed each life as a unique event in which a given moment or segment of experience finds its place within a totality of involvements, where each moment is comprehensible on the basis of past experiences (although being irreducible to them). His existential psychoanalysis, which is a form of inquiry aimed at the individual life history, attempts to understand how we live ourselves in time, facing the conditions within which we find ourselves, and finding our way to our "ownmost" possibilities of selfhood and fulfillment in a world we inhabit with others. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology was also centered on existential issues, with an emphasis on the nature of human embodiment and the relation of language to existence. Drawing upon his study of Gestalt psychology as well as of classical physiology, Merleau-Ponty provided an original synthesis of his philosophical and psychological predecessors in *Structure of Behavior* (1942/1963), and *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945/1962), which together are among the most psychologically oriented of the philosophical texts in phenomenology. Taking as his point of departure Sartre's (1943/1956) notion of the body as one's point of view on the world, Merleau-Ponty developed an ontology of the body as the perceptual and expressive vehicle of subjectivity. With Merleau-Ponty, the philosophical investigation of human experience itself becomes an activity of the "body-subject," and philosophy turns from shadows on the wall to the "prose of the world."

Although contemporary existential-phenomenological psychologists respect Husserl's original aim, they have developed a method that incorporates hermeneutic and dialectical principles, which has taken them far beyond the bounds of an eidetic science. Merleau-Ponty critiqued the idea that an eidetic science should necessarily precede an empirical science; and, following Heidegger (who stated that our essence *lies in* our existence), he claimed that eidetic investigation could only proceed in dialectical relation with its empirical foundations. The very intuition of essences, of which Husserl spoke, itself presupposes a consciousness engaged with concrete reality. Thus, the post-Husserlian project for an existential-phenomenological psychology recasts this discipline from a propaedeutic, purely eidetic, and thus philosophical one, to a heuristic process in which the tensions between the eidetic and empirical are resolved as we enter into the hermeneutic circle of interpretation.

Existential phenomenology has helped to establish a new paradigm for psychological research as well as for clinical interventions, insofar as no one psychological function or experience can be viewed any longer in isolation from another. It makes little sense to the phenomenologist to separate the discussion of perception and personality (as they always are in introductory psychology textbooks), for there is no personality that exists in isolation from the perceived world, and there is no human perception that is not already the expression of a particular personality. The same goes for motivation, cognition, emotion, development, intelligence, social psychology, and so on: Following the principle of Gestalt, no constituent within a structure can be considered apart from the structure as a whole. Likewise, each moment of our lives is treated in relation to our life as a whole: The part is viewed from the perspective of the whole. Finally, with its emphasis on human freedom in the co-constitution of meaning, existential-phenomenological psychology opens the door for a more hopeful approach to psychotherapy, one based on the possibility that disturbed people can choose to constitute their lives in less disturbing ways. We are neither trapped by our situation nor trapped by our past. This is not to deny that there are limiting conditions to our freedom, but rather to acknowledge that the paramount feature of psychological life is our existential aptitude for grasping and adapting to our situations in new ways.

[*See also* Existential Psychology; Gestalt Psychology; Phenomenology; *and* Psychology, *article on* Post World War II.]

Bibliography

Binswanger, L. (1963). *Being-in-the-world* (J. Needleman, Ed.). New York: Basic Books. Essential reading for anyone interested in a psychiatric application of Heidegger's phenomenological anthropology; one of the seminal texts in Daseinsanalysis.

Boss, M. (1979). *Existential foundations of medicine and psychology* (S. Conway & A. Cleaves, Trans.). Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson. (Original work published 1971.) Boss's magnum opus based on Heidegger's ontology of existence, this work has the distinction of representing the only psychological application of Heidegger's thought that was endorsed by Heidegger himself.

Casey, E. S. (1976). *Imagining: A phenomenological study*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Casey, E. S. (1987). *Remembering: A phenomenological study*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Both Casey volumes are meticulous applications of Husserl's method of intentional (*noetic–noematic*) analysis. They are perhaps the best demonstrations of Husserl's project for a phenomenological psychology.

Colaizzi, P. F. (1973). *Reflection and research in psychology: A phenomenological study of learning*. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt. A cogent demonstration of the empirical-phenomenological research paradigm developed at Duquesne University, this text compares individual intuition to empirically based phenomenological anal-

yses, and proposes a procedure that consists of a synthesis of empirical and intuitive phenomenological methods. The text includes demonstrations of this procedure as applied to the phenomenon of learning, and concludes with an uncompromising critique of traditional empirical psychology.

Fuller, A. (1990). *Insight into value: An exploration of the premises of a phenomenological psychology.* Early chapters offer a clear and compelling introduction to phenomenology and existential phenomenology. The remainder of the text consists of a dialogue between existential phenomenology and Gestalt psychology in an effort to formulate a concrete understanding of the interpretive process.

Giorgi, A. (1970). *Psychology as a human science: A phenomenologically based approach.* New York: Harper & Row. The paradigmatic text for phenomenological psychology that clarifies the importance of the methodological concept of approach, based on Dilthey's distinction between the natural sciences and the human sciences. This text also articulates a new vision for psychological theory and research, influenced strongly by Merleau-Ponty's notion of structure.

Giorgi, A. et al. (1971–1983). *Duquesne studies in phenomenological psychology* (Vols. 1–4). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. Four volumes of articles in the theory and application of a human science psychology grounded in the existential phenomenological tradition.

Giorgi, A. (Ed.). (1985). *Phenomenology and psychological research.* Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. A statement by the editor of research principles well grounded in the works of Merleau-Ponty, followed by four applications. Wertz's chapter on "Being Criminally Victimized" is without question the most empirically extensive, reflectively impressive, and best-written application of the Duquesne paradigm in print.

Heidegger, M. (1982). *Being and time.* (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). New York: Harper & Row. (Original work published 1927.) This is the book without which there would not be an existential phenomenological psychology today. It marks the most radical break with the tradition of Western thought of Derrida and others. But most important, it serves as the ontological foundation for the psychological (as well as ontological) work of thinkers like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Boss, and others.

Husserl, E. (1978). *Phenomenological psychology* (J. Scanlon, Trans.). Boston: Martinus Nijhoff. (Original lecture course given 1925.) Husserl's application of constitutive phenomenology to the psychology of perception is developed in this series of lectures demonstrating that phenomenology can be carried out in a mundane as well as transcendental attitude; a general conceptualization, or eidetics, of perception is established with the intent of guiding future empirical research. (It is here that Husserl most explicitly acknowledged his indebtedness to Dilthey.)

Husserl, E. (1982). *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy—First Book: General introduction to a pure phenomenology* (F. Kersten, Trans.). Boston: Martinus Nijhoff. (Original work published 1913.) Husserl's critique of the naturalistic prejudice is here followed by his presentation of the fundamental phenomenological outlook, the procedure of a phenomenological method, and a sketch of the general structures of "pure consciousness."

Keen, E., (1970). *Three faces of being: Toward an existential clinical psychology.* New York: Appeton-Century-Crofts. A clear introduction to existential psychology and Daseinsanalysis that includes the author's own synthesis of ideas, as well as summaries of Freud's case studies on the rat man and the psychotic Dr. Schreber, and a reprint of Binswanger's "Case of Ellen West," a classic paper in the Daseinsanalytic tradition.

May, R., Angel, E., & Ellenberger, H. F. (Eds.). (1958). *Existence: A new dimension in psychiatry and psychology.* New York: Simon & Schuster. The landmark text that first introduced existential psychiatry to the American reader; contains an excellent introduction by the editors, as well as classic writings by Ludwig Binswanger, Von Gebsattel, and others.

May, R. (Ed.). (1960). *Existential psychology* (2nd ed.). New York: Random House. An anthology with contributions from humanistic and existential psychologists (Maslow, Rogers, Allport, and May) on the Continental intellectual foundations for American humanistic psychology. Includes an annotated bibliography on existential and phenomenological psychology.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). *Phenomenology of perception* (C. Smith, Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1945.) One of the three most important foundational texts for an existential phenomenological psychology (along with Heidegger's *Being and Time* and Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*).

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). *The primacy of perception* (J. Edie, Ed.). Evanston IL: Northwestern University Press. This text is a collection of essays on psychology, art, and history. Of particular interest is the author's summary and defense of the central thesis of his *Phenomenology of Perception.* In addition, this volume includes a translation of his lecture course at the Sorbonne on "The Child's Relations with Others," which is the only existing excursion into a phenomenological approach to developmental psychology. Merleau-Ponty's important theoretical essay on "Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man" should be of interest to philosophers of science as well as those concerned with the dialectics of interrogation and similar methodological issues. The essay "Eye and Mind" on Descartes, Monet, and Cezanne, was the last piece Merleau-Ponty saw published in his lifetime.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1963). *The structure of behavior* (A. Fisher, Trans.). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. (Original work written 1938 and published 1942.) This is Merleau-Ponty's first book. Its first half is an unusual dialogue between the empirical physiological psychology of behavior (e.g., reflexology) on the one hand, and phenomenology on the other; the second half develops Merleau-Ponty's own vision of the structures of behavior in a radically gestalt interpretation.

Pollio, H. R. Henley, T., & Thompson, C. B. (1998). *The phenomenology of everyday life*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Half of this text is devoted to foundational issues in existential-phenomenological psychology, including theoretical and methodological issues, influenced to a large extent by Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, as well as by Buber, James, and Sartre. The second half consists of research demonstrations of the phenomenological paradigm as applied to topics drawn from everyday life, including interpersonal relations, feeling lonely, and the meanings of death in the context of life.

Sartre, J. P. (1948). *The emotions: Outline for a theory* (B. Frechtman, Trans.). New York: Philosophical Library. (Original work published 1939.) This is a small work that brings Sartre's "freedom-ism" to bear on the concrete psychological problem of emotions: in this work, Sartre first critiqued a variety of psychological approaches to emotion, such as the James–Lange and psychoanalytic theories, and then he developed his own theory, maintaining that emotions are chosen by people in order to avoid personal responsibility.

Sartre, J. P. (1956). *Being and nothingness: A phenomenological essay on ontology* (H. Barnes, Trans.). New York: Philosophical Library. (Original work published 1943.) This test develops the principles upon which Sartre founded his "existential psychoanalysis." His concrete illustrations of complex dialectical and ontological formulations of our nature as embodied consciousnesses help psychologists to appreciate the philosophical underpinnings of the work of existential psychologists such as Rollo May and R. D. Laing.

Spiegelberg, H. (1972). *Phenomenology in psychology and psychiatry*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. A virtual encyclopedia of all the figures who made important contributions to the phenomenological approach to psychology and psychiatry.

Valle, R. (Ed.). (1998). *Phenomenological inquiry: Existential and transpersonal dimensions*. New York: Plenum Press. A sequel and companion to the previous text, which incorporates both existential and transpersonal research approaches to research. The early chapters by Rolf von Eckartsberg (excerpted from his 1986 monograph, "Life-World Experience: Existential-Phenomenological Research Approaches in Psychology") provide an incisive overview of the entire field of existential phenomenological psychology. Other chapters explore methodological issues (such as the reliability of interpretive psychological research) and provide demonstrations of various research paradigms inspired by phenomenological philosophy.

Valle, R. S. & King, M. (Eds.). (1978). *Existential-phenomenological alternatives for psychology*. New York: Oxford University Press. This volume includes methodological contributions as well as research applications in the areas of learning, body image, perception, memory, person perception, anxiety, and cognitive development. There are also clinical applications in the areas of assessment, psychopathology, psychotherapy, and counseling.

Van den Berg, J. (1972). *A different existence: Principles of phenomenological psychopathology*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. A classic text introducing the reader in a clear and straightforward fashion to the phenomenological way of understanding our relationship to the world of things, to others, to our bodies, and to time.

Van Kaam, A. (1966). *Existential foundations of psychology*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. This text, which came out of Van Kaam's early work in the psychology departments at both Case Western Reserve and Duquesne Universities, articulates the foundations of traditional scientific psychology in contrast to a human science psychology, each as seen from the perspective of existential philosophy. The text also proposes a methodology for an anthropological psychology, that is, a psychology founded upon the principles of existential and phenomenological thought.

Scott D. Churchill

PHENOMENOLOGY as a systematic approach to philosophy and psychology was instituted by Edmund Husserl's numerous writings on the nature of subjectivity. Interestingly, the time during which Husserl wrote on the primacy and nature of consciousness almost exactly corresponds to the time in which Freud wrote about the primacy and nature of the unconscious. Both were students of Franz Brentano, who taught that the proper object of psychology was the sense, or meaning, or intent, of experience, rather than its mechanisms. To speak of the psyche as intentional is to acknowledge that it is always *directed toward* something. Husserl developed his "pure" phenomenology as a rigorous science that would explore the *intentional* foundations of knowledge (whereas Freud developed his psychoanalysis as a scientific psychology aimed at uncovering *unconscious* intentions). Husserl's interest can be described as a transcendental inquiry aimed toward the *a priori* structures of consciousness: the conditions of possibility for human experience, as well as for the knowledge systems based upon that experience. Husserl's aim was to overcome the pitfalls of relativism by founding knowledge on the appearance of self-evident matters to consciousness.

The term *phenomenology* derives from two Greek words, *phainomenon* and *logos*, which when put together mean "the letting appear of what shows itself from itself." Heidegger suggested that this means, in effect, the turning of one's regard toward the multiplicity of experiences wherein everything to which we relate shows itself. In simpler terms, phenomenology is the disclosure of things or events as they occur *for someone*, with the ultimate aim of uncovering and articulating the modes of presence that co-constitute, and thus make possible, the perception of all things and events. Phe-

nomenology is also a philosophical position that asserts that objectivity is an unreachable ideal, and that what heretofore has passed for objectivity is, more accurately, the result of intersubjective agreement. Thus, the phenomenologist smiles and winks when hearing someone talk about "objective facts" or "the event as it really happened" or even "absolute Truth," for it is precisely one's perspective (on facts, events, truths) that cannot be disassociated from whatever it is one is talking about. Perspectivity is thus the central theme of all phenomenological explications.

Philosophical Precursors

Husserl's work can be seen both as a continuation of the work of certain continental philosophers, such as Kant and Hegel, and also as a response to the empiricism that had come to command the philosophical foundation of psychology. Hegel had used the term *phenomenology* in 1807 to delineate a field of investigation of stages in the evolution of the mind's absolute knowledge of itself. Although Hegel carried out a kind of transcendental analysis of subjectivity, his interest was in characterizing the "Divine Mind" or Spirit (*Geist*) that would make possible the world as we know it. Husserl's own thought was, however, hardly influenced by Hegel's version of transcendental idealism. The radicality of his phenomenology lies in his overcoming Descartes's mutually exclusive categories of mind and body, subject and world, toward a mutually reciprocal "intentionality" of consciousness and life world.

The priority of conscious experience as the concrete foundation for intentionality reverses the usual priority of the objective over the subjective that positivism promotes. Nowhere can this reversal of priority better be seen than in the method of the phenomenological reduction, which requires us to set aside or bracket our natural belief in mundane reality, because that belief obscures the intentional experience that makes possible our taken-for-granted sense of the world. What gets bracketed in the reduction is the world as thematized from the natural standpoint, namely, the belief that the world exists independently of subjectivity (i.e., a belief that the world *actually is* the way it appears to the perceiver). The setting aside of this belief is not a denial of the existence of the real world, but only a methodological device that allows us to concentrate on something else. In its place, a different belief comes into play: a belief that experienced meanings are the correlates of particular attitudes assumed by consciousness. There is a turning, then, from "given facts" (*data*) to "grasped meanings" (*noemata*). Indeed, when one hears phenomenology defined as a study of appearances, this means precisely that it focuses on the individual's experience or co-constitution of what is given, rather than on the object itself that is given. Because attending to natural reality is our everyday attitude, we need the special method of the reduction to turn our attention back to consciousness, as well as to bracket the naturalistic prejudice by which the world of experience has typically been reduced to objective facts.

This priority given to consciousness over and above the objects of consciousness is prefigured in Kant's *transcendentalism*, a term that Husserl borrowed and used extensively to describe his own philosophy. Kant had attempted to discover the logical prerequisites (or necessary conditions) for human experience of the world, calling these *a priori* conditions "transcendental," since they make possible the experience of the world and thus cannot be contained in the world. Husserl wanted to turn to the lived acts of consciousness that make possible, or constitute, our experience of mundane reality. Kant had distinguished *phenomena* (the way things appear to consciousness) from *noumena* (the actual independently existing things themselves). Having established the transcendental ego as the ultimate knowing agency, Kant denied in principle the possibility of attaining knowledge of the world as it exists apart from the agency that seeks to know it. Where Husserl departed from Kant was in his insistence that the affairs to which consciousness returns be self-evident, that is, based upon an immediate self-showing, and thus not reducible simply to the transcendental schemas that enable such evidence to come into view. Husserl thereby sought to escape the pitfalls of rationalism and empiricism, realism, and idealism, by locating truth in "Being in the world" (Husserl, 1913/1982).

Of all authors considered to be precursors to Husserl's formulation of phenomenology, Brentano is the most immediate, since Husserl studied with him and explicitly recognized an indebtedness to Brentano's act theory of consciousness. In his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (New York, 1874/1973), Brentano established an epistemological basis for the division of scientific disciplines into those that study what is accessible to external perception (i.e., the senses) and those that study what is accessible only through inner perception (i.e., intuition). Following Brentano, Husserl saw that the field of lived experience is given to an inner perception (not to be confused with *introspection*), and thus delineates a field of knowledge that can be adequately intuited. Before encountering Brentano, Husserl had studied mathematics, asking more and more foundational questions concerning the possibility of knowing mathematical entities. These epistemological questions began to consume Husserl, and he found in Brentano's work an opening to the phenomenology of mathematics, asking, what acts of consciousness allow one to know mathematical entities? This question was soon widened to ask, what acts of consciousness allow one to know the entire variety of theoretical as

well as worldly entities that we encounter in life? This relationship of conscious act (*noesis*) to intended meaning (*noema*) is what would eventually be expressed by the term *intentionality*.

The Notion of Intentionality

Husserl's central insight, which would become the fundamental tenet of phenomenology, is that consciousness is always and essentially intentional, that is, oriented toward a world of emergent meaning: "Consciousness is always consciousness-of-something." Moreover, if there is no subject or consciousness without a world toward which it is aimed, there is also no objective world without a consciousness for which it exists. This is why, phenomenologically speaking, we do not describe an object (the *noumenon*, or the thing "in-itself"), but rather the object *as it exists for consciousness* (the *phenomenon*, or the thing "in-itself-for-someone"). Intentionality thus refers to this fundamental relationship of consciousness to world.

Brentano had used the adjective *intentional* to describe simply the directionality of consciousness, that is, its orientation toward a meaningful world. With Husserl, this term became a noun (*intentionality*), describing the fundamental characteristic of all perceptions, ideas, intuitions, and memories, namely, the irreducible relationship between knower and known. The concept of intentionality enables philosophy to advance beyond the limiting horizons of both subjectivism and objectivism, first of all by making clear that every statement is a description neither reducible to the object of perception (as in scientific realism with its empiricist epistemology), nor to the subject of perception (as in idealism with its mentalist epistemology). Rather, every statement is always already a description that bears reference to, and expresses, the structural relationship between consciousness and world: thus, every statement that we make expresses our intentional relationship to what we are speaking about.

Although it was originally developed in an analysis of perceptual objects, the concept of intentionality has been expanded by later phenomenologists to be applied to the whole array of human experience. It indeed serves as the essential foundational principle for phenomenological psychology. It is also the one concept in which phenomenology's stress on an orientation toward the future is most evident. It provides a clear contrast with empiricist philosophers' emphasis on the role of past experiences in determining the experienced present. This stress on future orientation was eventually taken in a purposive sense by existential phenomenologists. Husserl proposed that it is only because of our capacity to anticipate, or *intend*, future possible experiences that we can have a sense of present perceptual reality. Because at any one time we can experience only one perspectival view of an object, the possibility of our experiencing the object as a whole is called into question. Husserl thus developed his "horizonal" theory of perception, in which he proposed that in and through any presently experienced perspective we anticipate an entire system of future possible views (the perceptual horizon): we anticipate being able to perceive the backside of an object even if we cannot experience it directly at the moment. Were it not for this kind of anticipatory intentionality, we could not have a perceptual sense of an object beyond its own immediate mode of self-givenness.

As is apparent from the discussion up to this point, Husserl's phenomenology was a distinctively philosophical discipline. It was further divided into psychological and transcendental counterparts, both of which nonetheless retained the distinctive flavor of a philosophical endeavor. For Husserl, eidetic psychology must precede and serve as a propaedeutic basis for empirical psychology. Indeed, what he would later refer to as the "crisis" of European sciences is the fact that the sciences have proceeded to investigate their subject matters without first pausing to reflect upon the proper nature of, and requisite methodology for, these matters. Ideas pertaining to the nature of psychological phenomena, discovered through eidetic intuition, would properly guide empirical research, and therefore should occupy the psychologist's attention prior to engaging in empirical research.

Husserl's Contemporaries

Alexander Pfänder and Karl Jaspers deserve special mention, insofar as these thinkers were contemporaries of Husserl who engaged in phenomenological investigations of psychological phenomena. Pfänder's most comprehensive work on "the nature of the psyche" was never translated into English and thus has not had the impact on American psychology that it otherwise might have had. His studies of motivation and volition first appeared in 1900 and are among the most important (though often neglected) contributions to phenomenological psychology. Jaspers is well known in psychological and psychiatric circles not only for the tremendous scope of his description and analysis of psychopathologies, but also for being a pioneer in the interface between philosophy and psychiatry. His *General Psychopathology* (Chicago, 1913/1963) is phenomenological both in the sense of its being descriptive (though not yet eidetic) and insofar as his methodology employs an application of Wilhelm Dilthey's principle of *Verstehen* (understanding the part from the point of view of the whole, rather than the other way around, as in Cartesian analysis).

Alfred Schutz, like Jaspers, was interested in the affairs of consciousness within the sphere of mundane

life, and thus described his own work as a phenomenology of and within the natural attitude. Taking Husserl's transcendental insights as a point of departure, Schutz focused on the constitution of the social world. His research was primarily concerned with the commonsense structures of consciousness by which individuals are able to comprehend and co-constitute the nature of social reality. He also provided psychology with a useful paradigm for the description of perceptual and cognitive styles. Schutz's writings on social relations constitute part of the foundation of social constructionism.

Max Scheler was interested in emotional life, and wrote extensively on the essence of feelings, values, and love. His books on sympathy and *resentiment* are of particular interest to psychologists. He developed a philosophical anthropology that would serve as the basis for a sociology of knowledge and thus, like Schutz, Scheler became a precursor for the development of social constructionism.

Husserl's Legacy: Existential Phenomenology

In the wake of Husserl's pure, or transcendental, phenomenology, there developed a strain that is commonly referred to as *existential phenomenology*. Beginning with Heidegger's fundamental analysis of existence in *Being and Time* (1927/1962), there soon followed Jean-Paul Sartre's effort to synthesize his understanding of Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger into a statement of phenomenological ontology in his well-known but often misunderstood work, *Being and Nothingness* (1943/1956). Both Heidegger and Sartre were indebted to Kierkegaard for his focus on the individual situated subject (rather than some universal subject), as well as for his emphasis that truth exists most profoundly at the individual level. In particular, Kierkegaard's psychologically poignant analyses of fear, anguish, and despair served as points of departure for both Heidegger's and Sartre's thinking on these subjects. With regard to the predecessors of the existential phenomenologists, it is worth noting that Heidegger was also indebted to Dilthey as the source of inspiration for his own inquiries into human temporality. Moreover, it was Dilthey who first emphasized the importance of *Verstehen* ("understanding") as opposed to explanation in the approach to psychological life and human history. Dilthey proposed a radical distinction between the sciences of nature (*Naturwissenschaften*) and the sciences of culture (or human studies; *Geisteswissenschaften*). The former were characterized by explanation and the latter by understanding. *Verstehen* consists of a synthesis of all the powers of the psyche: thinking as well as sensing, feeling, intuiting, imagining, remembering, and so on. More importantly, understanding is what gives us access to the meaning of human events—to the purposes or goals embodied in individual acts. Heidegger would later employ this "understanding" in his own existential-hermeneutical method, and also included understanding among the essential existential characteristics of human existence.

Borrowing from existential thought that predated Husserl's phenomenology, existential phenomenologists attempted to infuse phenomenology's descriptive field of immediate experience and intentionality with the concept of freedom. To say that human subjects are intentional is to say that we are purposive, Sartre insisted. To be intentional is to be aimed, and we are free to choose how we are aimed toward our future. If, as Husserl proposed, our orientation toward the future establishes our sense of the world, then we are free to intend our sense of the world as we will: the world is never given to us as a brute reality. Not only our world, but also our past, is constituted by acts of consciousness that are fundamentally future oriented. Just as there is no brute reality assigned to the world independent of meaning-giving acts of consciousness, there is no brute reality to people's past. We can at any time reconstitute the meaning that the past holds for us, and in that sense we can reconstitute the past itself; as always for phenomenology, experienced meanings have priority over, and in fact determine, our sense of reality, whether it is the reality of the world or the reality of the past.

The greatest import of Husserl for psychology is probably to be found in his later thinking, which bears the influence of Heidegger, and which in turn served as a point of departure for Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological and psychological inquiries. In Husserl's *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1939/1970), we see at once a phenomenology still grounded in a transcendental standpoint, but also aimed at a radicalization of the relationship among philosophy, science, and society. For science to be not only relevant to the more mundane tasks of human life, but also to be free from distorting (ideological, theoretical) interests that can alienate the scientist from the interests of humanity (and even do violence to our essential nature), scientific inquiry must be grounded in a philosophy that is capable of (a) avoiding relativistic standpoints, while (b) directing the scientist toward an understanding of human affairs that is both faithful to human nature and serves humanity's best interests. For psychology, this means the development of a paradigm that avoids the biases of both mentalism and materialism, in order to formulate an understanding of human life that embraces the structure, or Gestalt, wherein consciousness and body are integral to each other, and relative to which psychological interventions would be addressed.

[*See also* Hermeneutics; Phenomenological Psychol-

ogy: *and* Psychology. *articles on* Nineteenth Century through Freud *and* Renaissance through Enlightenment.]

Bibliography

Dilthey, W. (1977). *Descriptive psychology and historical understanding* (R. M. Zaner & K. L. Heiges, Trans.). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. (Original works published 1924 and 1927.) This text introduces the reader to the spirit of a phenomenological approach to psychology without requiring the reader to first master the philosophical foundations of transcendental phenomenology, as in the case of reading Husserl. This edited volume contains two critical essays. The first ("Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytical Psychology") clarifies the project for a descriptive rather than an explanatory psychology (which later became the basis for Karl Jaspers's *General Psychopathology*). The second ("The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Expressions of Life") is a brief and very clear introduction to the the meaning of *Verstehen* ("understanding") as the defining methodological criterion for knowledge about the psyche. The text also serves as an introduction to hermeneutics.

Embree, L. Behnke, E., Carr, D., Evans, J., Huertas-Jourda, J., Kockelmans, J., McKenna, W., Mickunas, A., Mohanty, J., Seebohm, T., and Zaner, R. (Eds.). (1997). *Encyclopedia of phenomenology*. Boston: Kluwer. This contemporary source draws on multiple authors to explain the main concepts of phenomenology in great detail. In addition, the encyclopedia includes expansive sections on relations between phenomenology and other approaches to philosophy and the human sciences.

Gurwitsch, A. (1964). *The field of consciousness*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press. (Original work published 1957.) Beginning with a discussion of William James, Jean Piaget, and the Gestalt theories of Koehler and Kafka, this book presents a thoroughgoing phenomenological analysis of the organization of consciousness and the perception field. One of the most impressive applications of Husserl's method ever published.

Gurwitsch, A. (1974). *Phenomenology and the theory of science* (L. Embree, Ed. & Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. A collection of essays that presents the more difficult aspects of Husserl's philosophy of science, in a way that makes his import for psychology more apparent.

Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and time* (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). New York: Harper & Row. (Original work published 1927.) This is the phenomenological work that makes the most radical break with modern philosophy and its immanent Cartesianism. After studying with Husserl, Heidegger developed this phenomenological ontology, which is both more existential and more hermeneutic than Husserl's work. The central concept of *Dasein*, through which the essence of human being is defined as "being-in-the-world," departs from Husserl's more subjectivist constitutive phenomenology: but, in other regards, the book continues themes, such as the centrality of time consciousness, that were first introduced by Husserl. Its main contribution to psychology is the philosophical anthropology that was not, in fact, the ultimate aim of the book, but that was nonetheless taken up by a new breed of psychiatrists as an alternative to the more constricting models of the human person afforded by psychoanalysis and medicine.

Husserl, E. (1970). *The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology* (D. Carr, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1939.) Husserl's last published book takes a more cultural and historical approach to phenomenology than did his earlier works, discussing phenomenology in the context of the historical development of Western natural scientific thinking: this work is considered a bridge from the main body of Husserl's pure phenomenology to the existential phenomenology that was espoused by many of his followers, such as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.

Husserl, E. (1982). *Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and a phenomenological philosophy—First book: General introduction to a pure phenomenology* (F. Kersten, Trans.). Boston: Martinus Nijhoff. (Original work published 1913.) This is Husserl's most complete and programmatic statement concerning the methods and findings of "pure" phenomenology, in which the being of all entities is understood as constituted in, and through, acts of consciousness: thus, Husserl's pure phenomenology is also known as "constitutive" phenomenology.

Levinas, E. (1973). *The theory of intuition in Husserl's phenomenology* (A. Orianne, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1963.) A clear introduction to the philosophical method of phenomenology by an important figure within the movement.

Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). *Phenomenology of perception* (C. Smith, Trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Original work published 1945.) This is an extremely synthetic book, incorporating phenomenology with many of the insights of Gestalt psychology regarding perception and behavior: like his earlier text, *The Structure of Behavior*, it exhibits an unusual mastery of empirical psychology for a philosophical book. (These two books served, in fact, as Merleau-Ponty's doctoral dissertation.)

Natanson, M. (1973). *Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of infinite tasks*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Perhaps the single clearest introduction to the entire scope of Husserl's work, this is also one of the most engaging texts ever written in the field of phenomenology.

Pfänder, A. (1967). *Phenomenology of willing and motivation* (H. Spiegelberg, Ed. & Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. (Original works published 1900–1963.) This volume contains the only translated texts of this important contemporary of Husserl. It is of historical significance because it contains the earliest

published work in phenomenological psychology, pertaining to the phenomenon of motivation and volition.

Ricoeur, P. (1967). *Husserl: An analysis of his phenomenology* (E. G. Ballard & L. E. Embree, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. A more advanced introduction to the various aspects of Husserl's phenomenology, including summaries of his important studies on empathy and intersubjectivity during the 1920s that often are neglected.

Sartre, J. P. (1956). *Being and nothingness: A phenomenological essay on ontology* (H. Barnes, Trans.). New York: Philosophical Library. (Original work published 1943.) Sartre's extraordinarily expansive and systematic investigation on the place of freedom in human existence. He defined any denial of personal freedom in establishing the meaning of one's life as "bad faith" (or self-deception). It is in this book that Sartre developed the idea of an existential psychoanalysis that can replace the deterministic Freudian psychoanalysis that, in Sartre's opinion, amounts to a formal system of self-deception. Indeed, for Sartre, all empirical psychologies provide us with systems of excuse, insofar as they preclude the possibility of taking responsibility for one's actions.

Scheler, M. (1954). *The nature of sympathy* (P. Heath, Trans.). New Haven: Yale. (Original work published 1923.) Scheler was influenced by Husserl, but took off in his own direction by developing a philosophical anthropology, based on his analyses of various affective states. This text is a very accessible treatment of sympathy and "fellow feeling."

Schutz, A. (1967). *The phenomenology of the social world* (G. Walsh & F. Lehnert, Trans.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. (Original work published 1932.) The legacy of Husserl lives on in this application of the fundamental principles of phenomenology to social psychology and sociology. A programmatic statement for a methodological approach to all aspects of intersubjective life.

Spiegelberg, H. (1982). *The phenomenological movement* (3rd ed.). Boston: Kluwer. Spiegelberg's comprehensive survey of all major and minor figures in philosophical phenomenology has almost become a primary source in its own right because of the thorough and deep portrayals of the array of movements that make up phenomenology.

Scott D. Churchill and Paul Richer

PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY. *See* Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology.

PHILOSOPHY. [*This entry comprises three articles:*

The first article discusses the discipline of philosophy, its fundamental questions, historical development, major theories and approaches. The second article examines how the categories of "the mental" and "the physical" are to be understood in relation to one another and the dilemmas of the mind-body problem. The third article provides a broad profile of the nature of theory and explanation in psychology. See also Epistemology; *and* Metaphysics.]

An Overview

Philosophy (from the Greek word for "love of wisdom") arose in ancient Greece, where it was understood as including any pure intellectual inquiry conducted for its own sake. Plato (427–347 B.C.E.) maintained that philosophy replaced the unquestioning acceptance of myths with rationally justified belief. In this tradition, modern philosophy still defines itself as critical and rational inquiry into fundamental questions. In modern times, much of the traditional subject matter of philosophy has been delegated to the special sciences. Ever since the eighteenth century, *natural philosophy* (the study of nature) has been the provenance of physics and chemistry; by the mid-nineteenth century, *moral philosophy* (the study of humans) was turned over to such newly formed sciences as psychology and sociology. Even though much of the content of philosophy is now handled by the special sciences, colleges and universities continue to have philosophy departments, and philosophy remains central to most liberal arts programs. There are outstanding graduate programs in philosophy at Harvard, Princeton, and New York University, and philosophers participate in such major cognitive science programs as that at Rutgers University. The American Philosophical Association numbers over 8,000 members, and there are scores of journals printing philosophy articles, most notably the *Journal of Philosophy*, *Philosophical Review*, and *Nous*.

Most philosophers would agree that there are at least five main areas of philosophy: (a) *metaphysics*, the study of the ultimate nature of reality (e.g., the nature and existence of mind and matter, the question of the existence of God, the soul, and free will); (b) *epistemology*, or the theory of knowledge, which asks about the source, extent, and justification of knowledge; (c) *ethics*, the inquiry into right action and living a good life; (d) *aesthetics*, the study of the beautiful, with special emphasis on art; and (e) *logic*, the formulation and justification of the principles of right reasoning. In addition, the field of philosophy includes a variety of second-order inquiries (e.g., philosophy of religion, philosophy of art, political philosophy, and philosophy of law), which focus on the concepts, presuppositions and methods of other fields. Philosophy departments also